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Resumo
Com a crescente disseminac¸a˜o da computac¸a˜o distribuı´da nos u´ltimos anos, a forma como
prevenimos os erros de programas concorrentes e´ cada vez mais importante. O desenvol-
vimento de programas concorrentes e´ difı´cil, exigindo ao programador um grande esforc¸o
para tentar “prever” possı´veis estados futuros do programa. Num sistema concorrente a
execuc¸a˜o pode ter um amplo nu´mero de caminhos possı´veis cujo resultado pode ser ines-
perado. Mesmo realizando intensivos testes de software, pode-se nunca chegar a explorar
a sequeˆncia necessa´ria para encontrar os caminhos que levam a certos erros, tornando
estes testes insuficientes. Um dos erros difı´ceis de detetar e´ a ocorreˆncia de pontos de
bloqueio, designados por deadlocks.
Um sistema possui a propriedade de progresso, quando na sua execuc¸a˜o na˜o ocorrem
pontos de bloqueio. E´ necessa´rio provar que nenhum caminho possı´vel revela surpre-
sas, para garantir que existe progresso no sistema. A nossa abordagem procura garantir
a auseˆncia de pontos de bloqueio, para ale´m de outras propriedades de correcc¸a˜o, im-
plementando te´cnicas de verificac¸a˜o a serem usadas em ferramentas de ana´lise esta´tica
(apenas inspecionando o co´digo fonte). A verificac¸a˜o vai ser realizada em sistemas con-
correntes baseados em troca de mensagens, onde va˜o ser garantidas as propriedades de
fidelidade e progresso. Garantindo estas propriedades e´ possı´vel ter a certeza que as men-
sagens trocadas seguem um protocolo bem definido e que o sistema esta´ livre de pontos
de bloqueio.
A linguagem de modelac¸a˜o de sistemas usada no contexto deste trabalho e´ baseada
no calculo pi introduzido por Milner, Parrow e Walker [5, 6], um modelo universal de
computac¸a˜o que permite modelar e especificar de uma forma precisa sistemas de proces-
sos concorrentes, servindo posteriormente de suporte para te´cnicas rigorosas de ana´lise
de propriedades.
Para garantir a propriedade de progresso vai ser usado um sistema de tipos que unifica
a noc¸a˜o de evento com os tipos de sessa˜o introduzido por Honda, Kubo e Vasconcelos [2,
3] que permitem descrever o protocolo de comunicac¸a˜o entre dois participantes ponto-
a-ponto. O uso da noc¸a˜o de evento introduzido por Vieira e Vasconcelos [9], permite
capturar as dependeˆncias das comunicac¸o˜es entre processos e suporta a verificac¸a˜o que
estas esta˜o bem estruturadas.
Como objetivo, va˜o ser enderec¸adas comunicac¸o˜es ponto-a-ponto sendo-nos dadas as
especificac¸o˜es dos tipos (incluindo as anotac¸o˜es de eventos) e a ordenac¸a˜o de eventos, por
forma a conferir se o programa esta´ de acordo com as especificac¸o˜es.
Palavras-chave: Verificac¸a˜o de Software, Sistema de tipos, Fidelidade, Progresso,
Concorreˆncia.
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Abstract
With the growing dissemination of distributed computing in recent years, preventing
runtime errors in concurrent programs is increasingly important. The development of
concurrent programs is difficult, requiring from the programmer a great effort to “predict”
possible future states of the program.
In a concurrent system the execution can have a large number of possible paths, some
of which leading to unexpected behaviours. Even performing intensive software testing,
the explored sequence may never find the paths that lead to certain errors, making such
testing incomplete. Deadlocks are one of the hard to detect errors in concurrent systems.
We say that a system has the property of progress when its execution does not lead to
deadlocks. It is necessary to prove that no path reveals any surprises to ensure that there
is progress in the system. Our approach aims to ensure the absence of deadlocks in ad-
dition to other correctness properties, implementing verification techniques to be used in
static analysis tools (that just inspect the source code). The analysis will be performed
on concurrent systems based on message exchanges, targeting the properties of fidelity
and progress. Ensuring such properties means guaranteeing that the message exchanges
follow a well-defined protocol and that the system is free from deadlocks.
The language used to model systems in the context of this work is based on the pi-
Calculus introduced by Milner, Parrow and Walker [5, 6], a universal model of compu-
tation which allows to model and specify concurrent systems in a precise way, serving
subsequently as a support for rigorous analysis techniques. To ensure progress, we will
use a type system that unifies a notion of event with the session types introduced by
Honda, Kubo and Vasconcelos [2, 3] which allow to describe the communication proto-
col between two participants (point-to-point). The use of events introduce by Vieira and
Vasconcelos [9], allows to capture the communication dependencies between processes
so as to support the verification that such dependencies are well structured.
Our goal will be to support point-to-point communications, considering the type spec-
ifications (including the event annotations) and the orderings of events are given, which
allow us to check if the program is in accordance with the specifications.
Keywords: Software Verification, Type System, Fidelity, Progress, Concurrency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Concurrency in computational systems is increasing with the expansion of distributed
infrastructures of computation. Distributed software applications and multi-core archi-
tectures involve a large amount of communications. It is therefore essential to guarantee
correct interactions to have a reliable system that does what it is supposed to. Two funda-
mental correctness properties are fidelity and progress.
We say a system has (protocol) fidelity when the communication between the par-
ticipants follows the prescribed protocols. For example when a process is waiting for a
message containing a string and instead receives an integer, we say that there is no fidelity
because of the exchanged value type. Another simple example is when a process is ready
to output a message but there is no other process to receive the message as in p1 !x, so that
the process does not follow the introduced protocol.
We say a system has progress when it never incurs in deadlocks. A deadlock occurs
when a process A is holding on to some resource that a process B needs, while at the
same time, the process B is holding on to a different resource that process A needs. In
other words, when there is a cyclic dependency involving the processes and the allocated
resources.
The main motivation of this work is to verify the absence of deadlocks in addition
to other correctness properties. To accomplish this goal we implement verification tech-
niques to be used in static analysis tools. By detecting deadlocks previous to potential
execution the programmer prevents the deployment of programs with deadlocks, which
subsequently obviate the need to deadlock debugging, a difficult to carry out and very time
consuming task. In particular, it is difficult to get the same deadlock error intentionally
when debugging in a system with a extensive number of possible paths.
1
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1.2 Goals
The main goal of this work is the design and development of a static analysis tool that
guarantees fidelity and progress for message passing concurrent systems.
To model the concurrent systems in the context of this work we use a language that
is based on the pi-Calculus introduced by Milner, Parrow and Walker [6], which allows to
model and specify concurrent systems in a rigorous way, and subsequently supports exact
analysis techniques which allows us to assure the properties in all the possible “paths” of
a concurrent system.
To achieve the proposed work, we develop an analysis tool with support to point-to-
point communication. Namely we use a type system that unifies session types introduced
by Honda, Kubo and Vasconcelos [2, 3] with a notion of event following the approach
presented by Vieira and Vasconcelos [9]. Such event information allows to capture the
communication dependencies between processes and gives support to the verification that
such dependencies are well structured. The necessary type specifications (with event
annotations) and the orderings of events are provided by the programmer. Our analysis
tool statically analyses the source code and guarantees that message exchanges follow a
given protocol and that the system is free from deadlocks.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of our work are:
• Implementation of a type checking procedure that unifies the notion of session types
with events which involved refining the theoretical type system in which our work
is based.
• Development of a static verification tool which ensures progress in point-to-point
communications, that may be used via command line or via an Eclipse plugin.
1.4 Structure of the document
The next chapters of this thesis are structured as follows:
Chapter 2
Describes the background work and introduces necessary concepts, including the
pi-calculus, session types and presents the notion of event fundamental to our work.
Chapter 3
Introduces our static verification tool and describes how the tool works, explaining
each of the elements of the input specification that the tools needs the user to spec-
ify. Also, we present an account of the kind of errors that can be signalled by the
tool, and we present a series of illustrative examples.
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Chapter 4
Description of the implementation of the tool, technologies employed, including
a detailed account of the programming elements involved and a description of the
main steps of the verification program.
Chapter 5
Presents the conclusions and future work.

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces essential concepts necessary to our development. We first intro-
duce the pi-calculus [5, 6], a universal model of concurrent communicating processes that
will be used as our modelling language for concurrent systems. Then we introduce ses-
sion types [3, 2] which allow to describe the interaction between different processes in
a concurrent system, and may be used to ensure protocol fidelity in the communication
between the processes. Finally we introduce session types with events [9] which add to
session types an abstract notion of moment in time by adding an event annotation, which
will be used in our approach to assure progress of systems. We focus our presentation
on examples that help in providing some intuition about the main notions involved in our
work.
2.1 The pi-calculus
The pi-calculus [5, 6] is a foundational model of concurrent communicating processes,
which allows to focus on the communication of concurrent processes where interaction is
based on sending and receiving on channels. Channel identifiers grant access to the com-
munication channel itself. For instance, if x is a channel identifier then x! represents an
output on channel x and x? represents an input on channel x. In the input communications
it is necessary to specify the bound variable to be instantiated by the received value; for
example the input x?y specifies a reception from channel x of a value which instantiates
y in the continuation process. Accordingly in the output communications it is necessary
to specify the value to be sent on the channel; for example the output z!“hello” specifies
the output of string “hello” on channel z. A fundamental notion of this model is that
channel identifiers may be passed around in communications, allowing for processes to
gain access to channels previously unknown to them.
The example below illustrates a simple scenario where three partners interact. The
parallel composition (denoted by |) used in the specification of process System describes
5
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three processes which are simultaneously (concurrently) active.
Bob , (vchat) friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y .y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
System , Bob |Alice |Carol
(2.1)
The Bob process creates a new name chat and sends it on channel friend to Alice that
receives the identifier chat on the input friend?y . This allows Bob and Alice to share a
private channel (chat) after the synchronization on friend:
(vchat) (chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
| chat?q .chat !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.chat?answer)
| oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
Bob and Alice may now privately (without external interference) interact in channel chat ,
as its identity is known only to them, leading the first of such interactions to the system:
(vchat)(chat?a.oldfriend !chat
| chat !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.chat?answer)
| oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
Process Bob sent greetings to process Alice on channel chat . At this point, a second inter-
action in channel chat can take place, leading the system to the following configuration:
(vchat)(oldfriend !chat
| chat?answer)
| oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
The process Alice sent a text message to process Bob, sending greetings and asking who
is his friend via channel chat . At this point, process Bob is willing to share the identity
of channel chat with process Carol :
(vchat) (0 | ( chat?answer | chat !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”))
After sending channel chat to process Carol on channel oldfriend process Bob has no
other actions. At this point, process Carol can use channel chat to communicate with
Alice directly, sending “Hi Alice, my name is Carol.” and leading the system to the in-
active state below, which is structural congruent to the terminated process 0.
(vchat) (0 | 0 | 0)
2.1.1 pi-calculus language specification
Figure 2.1 shows the syntax of the language. The inactive process is denoted by 0. The
output communication is denoted by x!y.P which represents a process that sends y on the
channel x and then proceeds as process P . Symmetrically, the input communication is
represented by x?y.P which represents a process that is waiting to input on channel x a
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P ::= Processes
0 Inaction
x !y .P Output
x?y .P Input
∗x?y .P Replicated input
P |Q Paralel composition
(vx)P Name restricion
Figure 2.1: Syntax of processes
P | 0 ≡ P P1 |P2 ≡ P2 |P1 (P1 |P2) |P3 ≡ P1 | (P2 |P3)
P ≡α Q⇒ P ≡ Q (vx)0 ≡ 0 (vx)(vy)P ≡ (vy)(vx)P
P1 | (vx)P2 ≡ (vx)(P1|P2) (x /∈ fn(P1))
Figure 2.2: Structural Congruence
value which instantiates the bound variable z in the continuation process P . The repli-
cated input is similar to the input with the difference that the process survives in fraction
to continuously receive a name from the channel and proceed as process P . The parallel
composition P |Q represents two processes simultaneously active. The name restriction
(vx)P represents a process P with a local (private) name x. The occurrences of x in
(vx) and of y in x?y and in ∗x?y are binding with scope P in processes (vx)P , x?y.P
and ∗x?y.P , respectively. We represent by fn(P ) the set of free names of P , defined as
expected, for the definition of bound names.
We next define the operational semantics of the language based on the notions of
structural equivalence and of reduction. First we introduce the definition of α-equivalence
and Structural Congruence
Definition 2.1.1. (α-equivalence) We say that two processes P andQ are alpha-equivalent,
denoted by P ≡α Q if P and Q are equal up to a renaming of their bound names.
Definition 2.1.2. (Structural Congruence) . We say that two processes P andQ are struc-
turally congruent P ≡Q, if we can transform one in the other by using the least congru-
ence relation over processes that satisfies the equations in Figure 2.2 .
The rules of Structural Congruence are given in Figure 2.2. The first rule states that
the terminated process 0 is the neutral element in the parallel composition. The other two
rules in the first line state that parallel composition is commutative and associative. On
the second line, the first rule specifies the equivalence between two process that are alpha
equivalent, the second gives the possibility to elide or introduce an unused restriction and
the third rule shows the equivalence when the order of the bindings is changed. The last
rule, which is called scope extrusion, allows the scope of a binder to be extended to a
Chapter 2. Background 8
x?y .P | x !z .Q → P [z/y ] |Q
P → Q
(vx)P → (vx)Q (R-Com , R-New)
∗x?y .P | x !z .Q → ∗x?y .P |P [z/y ] |Q
P → P ′
P |Q → P ′ |Q (R-Rep , R-Par)
P ≡ P ′ P ′ → Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P → Q (R-Cong)
Figure 2.3: Reduction rules
process which does not have free occurrences of the bound name. We may now introduce
the Reduction relation which explains how systems evolve.
Definition 2.1.3. (Reduction) The reduction relation between processes is given by the
least relation that satisfies the rules in Figure 2.3 .
Figure 2.3 presents the reduction relation rules. Rule (R-Com) captures the synchro-
nization between an input and an output: the process x?y.P receives a name that is sent by
x!z.P — notice that z replaces y in the continuation process P . Rule (R-Rep) is similar to
(R-Com) with the difference that the replicated input is again in the resulting state ready
for further synchronizations. Rule (R-New) allows reduction to happen underneath scope
restriction. Rule (R-Par) allows reduction to happen in a part of a parallel composition.
The remaining rule (R-Cong) introduces structural congruence in the reduction relation,
stating that processes that are structurally equivalent have the same behaviour.
For the sake of illustration, we go back to Bob, Carol and Alice conversation, intro-
duced in Example 2.1 reproduced below focusing on the first reduction step.
Bob , (vchat) friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y .y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
System , Bob |Alice |Carol
(2.1)
The example above shows the initial state of the system, which after a first reduction step
is in the state bellow.
(vchat) (chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
| chat?q .chat !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.chat?answer)
| oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
We illustrate a derivation using the Example 2.1, in particular regarding the synchro-
nization on channel friend between Bob and Alice. The first rule applied is the reduction
rule (R-Cong) (see Figure 2.3). In the context of this rule the scope extrusion rule is ap-
plied, which allows the scope to be extended to Alice. The enlargement of the scope will
allow name chat to be sent to Alice underneath the scope of the name restriction.
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(vchat)friend !chat .R | friend?y .S |Carol
≡
(vchat)(friend?y .S | friend !chat .R) |Carol
The second rule applied is (R-Par) that grants the reduction between Bob and Alice while
Carol remains unchanged.
(vchat)(friend?y .S | friend !chat .R) → P
(vchat)(friend?y .S | friend !chat .R) |Carol → P |Carol
The third rule applied is (R-New) which allows reduction to happen underneath scope
restriction, where P is (vchat)Q .
friend?y .S | friend !chat .R → Q
(vchat) (friend?y .S | friend !chat .R) → (vchat)Q
Finally the rule (R-Com) is applied so the synchronization takes place on the channel
friend between Alice and Bob allowing Bob to send name chat to Alice , where R is
y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer and S is chat !“Hello Alice!”.
chat?a.oldfriend !chat
(friend?y .R | friend !chat .S ) → R[chat/y ] | S
Having presented the process specification language we next turn to presenting session
types that can be used to discipline interaction in message passing programs.
2.2 Session types
Session types [3, 2] allow to describe the interaction between different processes in a
concurrent system. One of the main goals of session types is to avoid runtime errors
via static analysis of the code, guaranteeing systems enjoy the protocol fidelity property,
which guarantees a well-established communication without unexpected communicating
actions from the participants. Without a well-established protocol there is no guarantee
that the system will do what is supposed to. This is possible to establish by describing the
protocol that represents the interactions among the participants in the communication, es-
tablishing for each participant its role in the interaction. Once the protocol is established,
the type checking procedure assures the absence of communication errors at runtime.
To understand this concept, we need to imagine a communication between two pro-
cesses on a channel, each one accessing one end point of the channel. Taking as example
a variable x which by itself gives access to any of the two end points of the channel, if x
is going to be used to send a boolean and then an integer the session type that describes
such usage of channel x is !boolean.!integer.end. The dual session type, which describes
the other endpoint in the communication is ?boolean.?integer.end. The ! represents the
sending and ? the receiving of a message followed by the type of the value carried in
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the message. The end type means that no further interaction is going to happen in the
channel.
An important concept is communication safety. For instance, if some process is wait-
ing for a boolean value and the other process sends a string value, it may lead to a runtime
error. This difference between the type of the value sent and the type of the expected value
is a problem for the receiving process which will use the value as if it is of the expected
type, leading to possible further errors in the system. This kind of errors are excluded by
communication safety (and also by fidelity which entails communication safety).
Vasconcelos [8] introduces a reconstruction of session types in a linear pi-calculus
where types are also qualified as linear or unrestricted. A linear channel must occur in
just two threads, without interference from other threads, and in opposition an unrestricted
channel may appear in a unbounded number of threads, thus being shared.
Using a type of handle annotation this can be specified accordingly. For example, the
un ? (lin ? Integer) adds to the description that the channel can be used zero or more
times, in zero or more threads while the received channel (lin ? Integer) must be used in
exactly one thread (once to receive an integer), because it is linear.
The following four examples, illustrate four simple similar cases of session types us-
age, with different situations. We use the exact same example as before (Example 2.1),
represented bellow to explain session types. Bob sends a string to Alice, then receives
her question and finally sends the communication channel to process Carol that replies
directly to process Alice. This is how the communication should flow between the three
processes.
Bob , (vchat) friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y .y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
System , Bob |Alice |Carol
(2.1)
The different points of view of channel uses, from each participant are defined by :
friend : lin ? ( lin ? string. lin ! string. lin ? string).end ` Alice
From the point of view of Alice, the channel friend is going to be used to receive a linear
channel. The received channel is used to receive a string, send a string and receive a string
in this order.
oldfriend : lin ? ( lin ! string).end ` Carol
From the point of view of Carol , the channel oldfriend is going to be used to receive a
linear channel. The received channel is used to send a string.
friend : lin ! ( lin ? string. lin ! string. lin ? string).end,
oldfriend : lin ! ( lin ! string).end ` Bob
From the point of view of Bob, the channel friend is going to be used to send a linear
channel that is used to receive a string, send a string and receive a string. The channel
oldfriend is used to send a channel that in its turn is used to send a string. Notice the
types of the usages delegated by Bob exactly match the usages performed by Alice and
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Carol , as in fact it is Bob that distributes the chat channel.
Analysing the code of the example we can statically guarantee that we have commu-
nication safety and fidelity. We now introduce same variants of the system where there is
no fidelity.
Bob , (vchat)friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y .y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y!12345
System , Bob |Alice|Carol
friend : lin ? ( lin ? string. lin ! string. lin ? string).end
oldfriend : lin ? ( lin ! string).end
(2.2)
In the Example 2.2 there is no communication safety since the channel chat is sup-
posed to be used to exchange three strings, and Carol who was supposed to send the
(last) answer to Alice sends an integer instead. This code would be excluded from our
type analysis, which could check that a conflict is present.
Bob , (vchat)friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y .y! “Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?q.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
System , Bob |Alice |Carol
friend : lin ? ( lin ? string. lin ! string. lin ? string).end
oldfriend : lin ? ( lin ! string).end
(2.3)
In the Example 2.3 the communication channel friend used by Alice is not used like
it is supposed to. Alice tries to send a string before receiving a string, so the participants
are not following a protocol, in particular the one specified by the type.
Bob , (vchat)friend !chat .chat !“Hello Alice!”.chat?a.oldfriend !chat
Alice , friend?y.y?q .y !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.y?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
Daniel , friend?y
System , Bob |Alice |Carol |Daniel
friend : lin ? ( lin ? string. lin ! string. lin ? string).end
oldfriend : lin ? ( lin ! string).end
(2.4)
In the Example 2.4 the channel friend is supposed to be used linearly, but it is not. The
linearity of the session types assures deterministic protocols, avoiding races (Daniel and
Alice on friend?y) and in addition to that, they do not use the channel chat consistently
which cannot happen neither in linear channels or in unrestricted channels. In summary it
is impossible to specify a protocol like this because we don’t know which “path” (Daniel
or Alice) will be “taken”. Since protocols described by session types are deterministic
one may talk about the several stages of the protocol as the “path” is known. Given
this informal introduction to session types we now turn to the formal specification of the
session type language.
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2.2.1 Session types language
Figure 2.4 describes the syntax of the types. The first part of the language captures the
communicating capabilities. We use the p to represent the polarities, the ! captures the
output communication, the input capability is captured by ? and the τ captures a syn-
chronisation pair. A system characterized by a τ message type is expected to have a
synchronization in that message internally, while a system characterized by a ! or by ?
message type is expected to interact with its external environment (either sending to it or
receiving from it, respectively) to synchronize in that message. The types are divided into
shared and linear, represented by the lin/un annotations. A shared type (unrestricted) sup-
ports multiple uses of the channel, where races are allowed, those allowing to support, for
example, a “typology” of many clients and a server. The linear type (lin) captures linear
usage of the channels, where no races are allowed and a sequence of linear deterministic
communications must be followed.
p ::= ! (Output)
| ? (Input)
| τ (Synchronisation)
L ::= end (No interaction)
| lin p T .L (Session)
T ::= L (Linear)
| un p T (Shared)
Figure 2.4: The syntax of types
A shared type un p T specifies a polarity p that captures a certain communicating capa-
bility, and a type T that describes the expected behaviour of the communicated channel. A
linear type lin p T .L is similar, with the difference of the continuation L that determines
the behaviour after the lin p T — this is possible in linear interactions due to existing a
single path, being thus possible to specify the remaining interactions. A linear type ter-
minates with end, meaning that no more interactions are to take place on that channel.
2.3 Session types using events
Session types with events add to session types the notion of event, this work [9] pre-
sented by Vieira and Vasconcelos was inspired in the notion of event from [4] and the
approach presented in [7]. An event is an annotation added to the session types which al-
lows to identify the communication event that is associated to the communicating actions
described by the session types. The main idea is to introduce a notion of timestamps that
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represent the abstract moment when each input or output action is supposed to happen,
mainly allowing to causality-based relate the communication actions among them.
The events support the definition of a strict partial order that captures the dependen-
cies between the communicating actions of the program. The goal is to assure the absence
of deadlocks prior to the execution of the code, just by looking at the source of the pro-
gram. With the complete notion of the overall order of the events, we are able to verify
the progress property.
Channel Types with events :
x : e1 τ Integer
y : e2 τ String
Process :
x !23.y !“How old are you?” | y?question.x?answer
(2.5)
Example 2.5 shows a simple program that is deadlocked: we have a process with a
parallel composition which uses two channels, channel y to ask a question and channel x
to answer the question. This program is deadlocked because both threads are waiting for
a synchronization that cannot take place: the process on the right hand side is waiting to
synchronize on y while the process on the left hand side is waiting to synchronize on x .
The fact that the other endpoints of channel x and y are not immediately active originates
the deadlock — notice there is a cyclic dependency on the channel usages. Using the
event annotations associated to the channels we may detect the cyclic dependencies that
cause the deadlock, as we show in the following paragraphs.
For each synchronization we attribute distinct event annotations, for example the event
annotations e1 and e2 correspond to the synchronization on channel x and y respectively.
Inspecting the process on the left hand side of the process we conclude that the ordering
of events is e1 ≺ e2 since the interaction on channel x precedes the interaction on channel
y — we use e1 ≺ e2 to say that the event e1 happens before event e2.
On the right hand side of the process a different order of actions on the channels x
and y is present and the ordering of the events is e2 ≺ e1, because the channel y is used
before channel x. This leads to a cyclic dependency (e1 ≺ e2 and e2 ≺ e1), allowing us to
exclude the program as (potential) deadlock.
We turn to a familiar example, now focusing on the progress property.
Bob , friend?y .y !“Hello Alice!”.y?a.oldfriend !y
Alice , (vchat)friend !chat .chat?q .chat !“Hello Bob, who is your friend ?”.
chat?answer
Carol , oldfriend?y .y !“Hi Alice, my name is Carol.”
System , Bob |Alice |Carol
(2.6)
Example 2.6 exhibits a communication similar to the Example 2.1 with the difference that
this time it is Alice that creates the private channel chat and sends it to Bob. The process
Bob receives the channel from Alice, uses the channel and then sends it to be used by
Carol . In our approach, progress is also ensured in this kind of situation where processes
interact on different channels (including received ones) in sequence.
Chapter 2. Background 14
Example 2.6 allows to introduce the notion of strict partial order, used to verify if the
program has a well-formed communication structure (without cyclic dependencies). This
order consists of a binary relation that allows to capture communication dependencies by
establishing an order of the events associated to the communication actions. This order is
strict (an event can’t happen before itself e1 ≺ e1), transitive and partial (since not all the
events are related and are not be temporally related). The pairs in the relation represent
a temporal dependency: the first event of the pair happens before the second event, i.e.,
e3 ≺ e1 denotes that (e3, e1) is a pair of the relation which represents e3 happens before e1.
The different points of view of channel uses with the strict partial orders of the ab-
stract events, from each participant are defined by :
friend : e1 lin ! (e2 lin ? string. e3 lin ! string. e5 lin ? string).end ` Alice
From the point of view of Alice the order of events expected is e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 ≺ e5 ,
since the process first uses the channel friend to send a channel (e1) , then it receives a
string from the channel chat (e2), sends a string (e3) and receives another string (e5) in
this order.
oldfriend : e4 lin ? ( e5 lin ! string).end ` Carol
From the point of view of Carol the expected order of events is e4 ≺ e5 , since it first
receives a channel on the channel oldfriend (e4) and then uses the channel to send a string
(e5).
friend : e1 lin ? ( e2 lin ? string. e3 lin ! string. e5 lin ? string).end ,
oldfriend : e4 lin ! ( e5 lin ! string).end ` Bob
From the point of view of Bob the order of events expected is e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 ≺ e4 ≺ e5,
since the process first receives from channel friend the private channel and then from
this order, sends a String (e2), receives a string (e3) and sends the private channel on the
channel oldfriend (e4) which is then used to send a string (e5).
The orderings of the events e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 ≺ e5, e4 ≺ e5 and e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 ≺ e4 ≺ e5
are sound since gathering the relations we obtain the strict partial order e1 ≺ e2 ≺ e3 ≺
e4 ≺ e5.
2.3.1 Session types using events language
Figure 2.5 describes the syntax language of the types using events. The language is very
similar to the previous one, presented in the Figure 2.4. What makes this language dif-
ferent is the notion of event represented by an e. The language now allows to specify a
relation between the communicating action and the timestamp, that represents the abstract
time in which the action takes place.
We assume given an infinite set of events, ranged over by e, e1, . . ., used as event
identifiers. A shared type e un p T , specifies a polarity p that captures a certain communi-
cation capability, with an event e, that creates the association between the action and the
notion of event. A linear type e lin p T .L follows the same lines with the difference that L
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p ::= ! (Output)
| ? (Input)
| τ (Synchronisation)
L ::= end (No interaction)
| e lin p T .L (Session)
T ::= L (Linear)
| e un p T (Shared)
Figure 2.5: The syntax of types with events
represents the behaviour that takes place after e lin p T . The type T describes the expected
behaviour of the communicated channel.
2.4 Summary
This chapter gives an overview of the main concepts in background work. The pi-calculus
model introduced in Section 2.1 allows to focus on the communication between concur-
rent processes by modelling the interactions based on sending and receiving on channels.
Session types presented in Section 2.2 describes programs protocol with a representation
of the interactions among the participants in the communication. Each participant has its
own role established in the protocol. With the expected interactions specified for each
participant by the session types it is possible to identify systems that enjoy the protocol
fidelity property. The session types with events introduced in Section 2.3 introduces the
notion of an event, which allows to associate an abstract timestamp to each communi-
cation action. Building on session types with events we may develop a tool to statically
verify the progress property.

Chapter 3
Static verification tool
In this chapter we describe how the static verification tool works and which input is
needed in the verification process such as the variable declarations, order of the events
and the process.
3.1 Input Specification
This sections explains the input that the programmer has to provide to use the static veri-
fication tool. The tool receives a file with extension “.p” which contents are illustrated in
Listing 3.1 and described in the following paragraph.
The first element in this example is a type declaration defined in the first line by
Type A = e1 lin # boolean.end which allows to define type abbreviations. The variable
declarations specifies the channel names and their respective usage in terms of the session
types with events; notice that the usage of channel a is defined by the abbreviation name
A that represents a previously specified type declaration. According to type A, channel a
has a synchronization of a message content with a boolean type, while the channel b will
synchronize a message content with a string type. Each of the communication types has
a correspondent event associated to their usage, in this case the synchronization in chan-
nel a is associated to timestamp e1 and the synchronization in channel b is associated to
timestamp e2. The second element is the order which specifies the temporal dependencies
of the events, which, in this example, specifies that the event e1 has to precede the event
e2. The last element included in the input is the process. The process in this example is
formed by a parallel composition which specifies both branches of the composition are
simultaneously active. On the left side of the parallel composition we have an output from
the channel a followed by an output in channel b, while on the right side accordingly we
have an input in channel a followed by an input in channel b. This results in a synchro-
nization on channel a and then another on channel b.
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Listing 3.1: Input file example
Type A = e1 l i n # boolean .end
TypingContext = ( booleanVar : boolean ;
s t r i ng V a r : str ing ;
a : A ;
b : e2 l i n # str ing .end )
Order = ( e1<e2 )
a ! booleanVar . b ! s t r i n gV a r | a? r e s u l t . b? r e s u l t 2
3.1.1 Typing Context declarations
The typing context declarations specify the name of each variable and their respective
protocol. The declarations allow to create a type environment which stores the specified
protocol type usage of each variable name. To declare the typing context in the program
the user must write TypingContext = ( name : protocol) where the first parameter defines
the name to be associated to the variable and the second parameter specifies the session
type protocol to be used by that variable. Multiple variables can be defined, just by using
the “ ;” operator to separate the different declarations.
3.1.2 Order
In order to be able to verify the progress of a communication we need the partial order of
the events associated to the session types and access to the order efficiently as part of the
verification process.
The order specify a relation “happens-before” between the different events in the com-
municating program. The user must specify the order by writing Order = followed by the
event relations using the operator “<” in the middle of two events i.e., Order = (e1<e2)
means that event e1 happens before event e2. To split possible different sets of unrelated
event relations we use “ ;”, i.e. (e1<e2<e3<e4);(e5;e6) which says that the event e5 hap-
pens before event e6 but neither of them are related to the remaining events in the order
as illustrated by Figure 3.1.
Further details from the order implementation and methods will be presented in the
following chapter.
3.1.3 Processes
In this section we describe the different types of processes that can be used to specify
a communication-centred program. The communication processes can be divided into
channel creation processes, input processes, output processes, parallel compositions and
in inactive process. Listing 3.2 will help us introduce the different types of processes.
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Figure 3.1: Order illustration example
Listing 3.2: Private session example
Type Chat = e2 l i n # str ing .end
TypingContext = ( server : e1 un ? ( e2 l i n ! str ing .end ) ;
s t r i n g H e l l o : str ing )
Order = ( e1<e2 )
* server ?msg .msg ! s t r i n g H e l l o |
new chat : Chat in server ! chat . chat?s |
new chat2 : Chat in server ! chat2 . chat2?s2
Channel creation
A channel creation allows to declare free variable names in the communication process to
use as “private” names bound to the continuation process i.e. (new a : e1 lin # boolean
in P) where a is the name of the channel and the channel usage is a linear synchronisation
of a boolean type, associated to the event name e1, followed by the respective continua-
tion process P which is the scope of the restricted name. A channel creation with a shared
type can be used to create a private session with other process like Example 3.2 demon-
strates. This example illustrates the interaction between two clients and a server. The
communications are performed through a private session initiated from the clients side.
The clients create a channel with the type usage (e2 lin # string.end) which means that
a linear synchronisation of a message content with a string type takes place after the
private session is established with the server. The created channel chat and chat2 respec-
tively in each process and the following synchronisations allows each client and the server
to communicate on a private session where they then interact. Notice that the server can
handle an unlimited number of clients as the channel usage is specified as a shared input
communication by the un ? annotation which is continuously waiting to receive a channel
in *server?.
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Input and Output Processes
The input and output processes can be divided in a linear communication or a shared
communication depending on the channel usage specified. If the usage specified for a
certain channel is a linear type, then the interaction must be carried out exactly once. If
the specified type is a shared communication, then it supports various interactions like an
open service, for example un ? ( lin ? boolean ) describes the usage of a shared channel
that can be used zero or more times by a client, i.e., un ! ( lin ? boolean ). Notice
instead that the message type specifies a linear synchronization lin (carrying a boolean
value).
In Example 3.2 we have an open service made available by channel server, which is
continuously waiting to receive a channel to perform the output of stringHello . From the
client side point of view, each of the clients perform an shared output of a new private
channel they just created on channel server to initiate a private session. After the private
session takes place further interactions can happen, in this case each of the clients perform
a (linear) input on the created channel (chat?s and chat2?s2), to receive the message
content that the server sends on a (linear) output (msg!stringHello).
Parallel composition
The parallel composition P|Q says process P and process Q are simultaneously (concur-
rently) active. In Example 3.2 the parallel compositions allows two client processes and
one server process to interact.
Inaction process
This type of process represents the inaction in our type system, which to simplify is omit-
ted from the process specifications. For instance we write x !a instead of x !a.0 to specify
an output followed by inaction.
3.2 Verification process
A specification file is loaded in the tool to start the verification. Before starting the main
verification of the communicating program, we perform a consistency check (see the de-
scription in Section 3.2.1) to all the variable declarations. The tool runs multiple rules
over the specified processes, verifying if the sessions types protocol (with the event anno-
tations) of each channel communication are concordant with their usage and order. After
processing the file, the tool returns a boolean with the final result including an error mes-
sage if the validation fails. If the result is positive, then the progress property is assured
for that system.
3.2.1 Consistency check
The consistency check consists in confirming if all the associated events of the specified
protocols in the variable declarations are consistent and in conformance with the specified
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strict partial order. We have a problem of consistency when the events associated to a
certain channel are not consistent to the order itself, for example if in the global order the
event e1 happens before the event e2 , it is not possible that there exists a channel with
the events e1 and e2 associated where this relation (e1 ≺ e2 ) is not respected. Another
possible cause of failure is the presence of an illegitimate event which is an event that
is non-existent in our order, causing a problem of conformity. If this verification fails
the user is presented with an inconsistent event(s) type of error which is presented in
Section 3.2.2.
3.2.2 Error Messages Types
It is necessary to provide some relevant information to the user when a communicating
program fails in our static verification. In this subsection we will explain the different
types of error which the user can be presented when the verification fails.
Syntax Errors
This kind of error happens when the user does not specify the input specifications cor-
rectly, hence the communicating program must be written accordingly to our grammar.
Unmatched communications
When some linear communication fails to be matched, this kind of error is presented with
the respective unmatched channel type. For a communication to be matched in our type
system, it must respect the predicate from Figure 4.1, used in our type system from [9]
which do not accept type communications that specify pending communications actions
(see the description for rule in Section 4.6.2).
Type was not fully used
This kind of error happens when a communication type protocol fails to be in a correct
and expected state after a certain part of the verification. This kind of verification is also
performed in the end of the main type verification to guarantee that no communication
protocol in the type environment was left unused which would mean that an error had oc-
curred. When this error happens, the user is informed with the channel and the respective
type protocol that induced the error.
Inconsistent event(s)
When some event fails to be consistent with the actual global order of the events, this
error is presented with the respective event failure. For an event to be inconsistent with
the global order it must fail to be in a “correct position” according to the event marker of
our strict partial order, which means that the event had already “happened in time” leading
to a problem of consistency with the specified order. This kind of error can happen in any
moment of the main verification to the communication processes, but can also happen
before, since all the events associated to the variable declarations are verified to be in
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concordance with the order in the consistency check like previously mentioned in the
verification process.
Invalid type protocol
When a certain process contains an invalid communication type, this is presented to the
user with the information of the incorrect channel type associated to the process with the
respective erroneous type protocol.
Type of protocol not respected
This type of error is presented when the type protocol of a channel that is going to be
output is not compatible with the specified type protocol in the type parameter of the
output type. For example consider the following output specified by the type protocol
(e1 lin ! (e2 lin # string.end).end) where it is expected to output a channel that will
be used to make a synchronization of a message with a string in their content. If for
some reason the channel type that is trying to be output have a type protocol that is not
compatible with the type parameter of the output type (in this case e2 lin # string.end)
then this error will be presented to the user with the respective informations regarding to
the channel types.
3.3 Input Specifications Examples
In this section we present some example of communications programs and explain the
response of the verification tool towards them.
The first example, represents a communicating program specified to perform two lin-
ear synchronizations using channel a, first a message with boolean type and after a mes-
sage with a string type.
TypingContext = ( booleanVar : boolean ;
s t r i ng V a r : str ing ;
a : e1 l i n # boolean . e2 l i n # str ing .end )
Order = ( e2<e1 )
a? r e s u l t . a ! s t r i ng V a r | a ! booleanVar . a? r e s u l t 2
It happens that the events e1 and e2 associated to the type protocol, do not respect the
global order (e1 ≺ e2) creating an inconsistent event(s) kind of error (Section 3.2.2), so
the tool responds with the following error message :
The sessions types events are NOT consistent with the global order
(e2 < e1).
Channel a, with the session type (e1 lin # (boolean) e2 lin #
(string).end) does not respect the global order.
The following example represents a communicating program with two channels with
one synchronisation each. The channel a has a type protocol which specifies a synchro-
nisation on a message containing a string, while channel b specifies a synchronisation
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message containing a boolean. The prefix type of channel a has the event e1 associated,
while the event e2 is associated to the prefix type of channel b.
TypingContext = ( booleanVar : boolean ;
s t r i ng V a r : str ing ;
a : e1 l i n # str ing .end ;
b : e2 l i n # boolean .end )
Order = ( e1<e2 )
b? r e s u l t . a ! s t r i ng V a r | a? r e s u l t 2 . b ! booleanVar
The problem of this communicating program is that the usage of the channel b does
not respect the global order (e1 ≺ e2), according to channel usage. Although on the right
side of the parallel composition the channel usage is consistent with the order, on the
left side, channel b does not respect the order when it tries to perform a synchronisation
before the one from channel a, that have an event associated with a lower order. This
problem creates an inconsistent event(s) kind of error but of a different kind regarding
to the previous example, since this inconsistency results from an improper use of the
channels and not by an inconsistency in the order of the events associated to a single
protocol. The tool responds with an error stating that the event e1 associated to channel a
is not of greater order (since it was supposed to be greater than event e2 that already had
happened):
Process :
(a!stringVar)
Channel :a
Session type : e1 lin # (string) .end
Error : the event in the usage of a (e1) is of lesser order and
cannot be used in this context.
The following communicating program is based on an example from [9] with a slight
variation which results in an error.
Type CHAT = e4 l i n # str ing . e2 l i n # str ing .end
Type sType = e6 l i n # CHAT.end
TypingContext =
( handle : e1 un ? ( e2 l i n ? str ing .end ) ;
s t r i n g H e l l o : str ing ;
s t r ingBye : str ing ;
se rv i ce : e3 un ? ( e4 l i n ! str ing . e2 l i n ? str ing .end ) ;
masterserv ice : e5 un ? ( e6 l i n ? ( e4 l i n ! str ing .
e2 l i n ? str ing .end ) . end ) )
Order = ( e3<e5<e6<e4<e1<e2 )
new chat : CHAT in
serv i ce ! chat . chat?s . chat ! s t r ingBye |
* se rv i ce ?y .new s : sType in masterserv ice ! s . s ! y |
* masterserv ice?z . z?y . handle ! y . y ! s t r i n g H e l l o |
* handle?z . z?s
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The communicating program in the example represents an open service being used by
one client, where in the communication they are supposed to exchange some messages
type contents containing strings. The service is represented by channel service, which
delegates the communication with the client to channel masterservice that is supposed
to send the stringHello to the client and delegate to channel handle to receive the re-
sponse. Notice that all the three channels are shared communications prepared to receive
multiple clients. The slight variation in this example regarding to the original is that the
masterservice makes the delegation before sending the expected stringHello which re-
sults in a “type of protocol not respected” kind of error. The channel handle is supposed
to receive a channel with a type protocol compatible with (e2 lin ? string.end). Instead
of receiving a compatible type, channel handle receives channel y with the type protocol:
(e4 lin ! (string) . e2 lin ? (string) .end). This incompatibility with the types results
from channel masterservice trying to delegate channel y to channel handle before sending
the stringHello channel (y! stringHello), specified by the unused prefix (e4 lin ! (string
)) which results in the following error :
Process :
(handle!y.y!stringHello)
Channel :y
Session type : e4 lin ! (string) e2 lin ? (string) .end
Error : y is not compatible with the expected parameter type of
channel handle (e2 lin ? (string).end).
The following example represents a communicating program with one synchroniza-
tion of a message content containing a boolean type on channel a, followed by the chan-
nel creation of b with the protocol (e4 lin ! boolean.e5 lin ? boolean.end) that is as-
sociated to the type declaration bType, which is bound to the continuation process b!
booleanVar.b?result.
Type bType = e4 l i n ! boolean . e5 l i n ? boolean .end
TypingContext = ( booleanVar : boolean ;
s t r i ng V a r : str ing ;
a : e1 l i n # boolean .end )
Order = ( e1<e4<e5 )
a ! booleanVar .new b : bType in b ! booleanVar . b? r e s u l t | a? r e s u l t
This example allows to demonstrate an error caused by an unmatched type communi-
cation, that takes place when the channel creation from b tries to create the channel with
an unmatched protocol type associated that do not respect our type system (according to
predicate illustrated in Figure 4.1). Presented with this example our tool responds with
the following error :
Process :
(new b in b!booleanVar.b?result)
Channel :b
Session type : e4 lin ! (boolean) e5 lin ? (boolean) .end
Error : is not a matched linear communication.
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The following example represents a program with a synchronisation on channel a. The
variable declaration for channel a introduces the protocol e1 lin # (e4 lin ? boolean.
end).end, where the parameter type e4 lin ? boolean.endmeans that the channel is used
to receive a message containing a boolean value. The channel creation new c: cType in
means that channel c is assigned the protocol defined by the type declaration cType.
Type cType = e4 l i n # boolean .end
TypingContext = ( booleanVar : boolean ;
a : e1 l i n # ( e4 l i n ? boolean .end ) . end )
Order = ( e1<e4 )
new c : cType in a ! c . c ! booleanVar | a?cChannel
The problem resulting from this example is that channel c is supposed to perform
a synchronisation but fails to do so because there is no linear input on c to complete the
communication. Notice that all it takes to resolve this problem is to add to the right side of
the parallel composition a linear input on channel cChannel, as for example a?cChannel.
cChannel?result. This problem results in the following error :
Process :
(a?cChannel)
Channel :cChannel
Session type : e4 lin ? (boolean) .end
Error : was not fully used.
Listing 3.3: Professor and Student Example
Type de l iverType = e1 l i n # str ing . e2 l i n # boolean .end
Type pr ivateType = e3 l i n # str ing . e4 l i n # boolean .end
TypingContext =
( evalBoolean : boolean ;
workSt r ing : str ing ;
tpc : e5 un ? ( e1 l i n ? str ing . e2 l i n ! boolean .end ) ;
eva luate : e6 un ? ( e3 l i n ? str ing . e4 l i n ! boolean .end ) )
Order = ( e5<e1<e6<e3<e4<e2 )
new d e l i v e r : de l i verType in
tpc ! d e l i v e r . d e l i v e r ! workSt r ing . d e l i v e r ? r e s u l t |
* tpc?x . x?studentWork .new p r i v a t e : pr iva teType in
evaluate ! p r i v a t e . p r i v a t e ! studentWork . p r i v a t e ?eval . x ! eva l |
* eva luate?z . z?work . z ! evalBoolean
The example illustrated in Listing 3.3, represents a program with a process containing
three concurrent branches in parallel representing a student, a professor and an assistant.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the channel communications between three processes. The com-
munication starts when the process creates a private channel deliver to start a private
session with the professor. The created deliver channel allows the student to send the
work to the professor and then to receive the evaluation. After receiving the student work,
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the professor delegates the marking to the assistant. To communicate with the assistant,
the professor creates the channel private which allows the professor and the assistant to
exchange the students work and the respective evaluation. After the professor receives the
evaluation, he sends it back to the student using the previously created session (deliver ).
This program, which includes a sort of session interleaving which other approaches are
incapable of addressing, is accepted by our tool.
Figure 3.2: Message sequence chart for the work delivery example
The last example, illustrated in Listing 3.4, shows a program that deadlocks. The first
reduction step invokes the service. The second reduction passes the reply channel as a
parameter to the service, yielding the following process (types omitted) .
new r ep l y in new request in
request?y . r ep l y ! booleanVar . y? r e s u l t |
request ! r ep l y |
* se rv i ce ?z .new r ep l y in z ! r ep l y . z ! r ep l y
The request channel sent by service (in sub-process service!request) is used in the
continuation process to receive the output capability (request?x), and then the input ca-
pability (request?y) from a channel with the protocol type : e4 lin # boolean.end. The
problem happens because the input communication (reply?result) is performed in the
continuation of the output communication (reply !booleanVar), so there can be no possi-
ble synchronization and therefore there is a deadlock.
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Listing 3.4: Example of a deadlock
Type requestType = e2 l i n # ( e4 l i n ! boolean .end ) .
e3 l i n # ( e4 l i n ? boolean .end ) .end
Type replyType = e4 l i n # boolean .end
TypingContext =
( booleanVar : boolean ;
se rv i ce : e1 un ? ( e2 l i n ! ( e4 l i n ! boolean .end ) .
e3 l i n ! ( e4 l i n ? boolean .end ) .end ) )
Order=(e1<e2<e3<e4 )
new request : requestType in
serv i ce ! request . request?x . request?y . x ! booleanVar . y? r e s u l t |
* se rv i ce ?z .new r ep l y : replyType in z ! r ep l y . z ! r ep l y
Listing 3.5: Session types without event annotations
requestType = l i n # ( l i n ! boolean .end ) . l i n # ( l i n ? boolean .end ) . end
replyType = l i n # boolean .end
serv i ce : un ? ( l i n ! ( l i n ! boolean .end ) .
l i n ! ( l i n ? boolean .end ) .end )
Notice that the session types without the event annotations given in Listing 3.5 would
describe a classic well-typed session typed system, thus not excluding the deadlocked
configuration. Instead, our tool excludes this system and presents the user with the fol-
lowing error:
Process :
(reply2?result)
Channel :reply2
Session type : e4 lin ? (boolean) .end
Error : the event in the usage of reply2 (e4) is of lesser order
and cannot be used in this context.
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3.4 Users manual
In this section we explain how to use our static verification tool using the command line
and using an Eclipse Plugin.
3.4.1 Running from the command line
To run our static verification tool using the command line it is necessary to follow this
steps.
1. Download the ProPi.jar available in http://download.gloss.di.fc.ul.
pt/propi/jar/ProPi.jar) which contains the verification tool ready to be ex-
ecuted.
2. Type an input specification (as demonstrated in Section 3.1) according to our gram-
mar.
3. Run the jar file through the command line using the command :
java -jar ProPi.jar.
4. Specify the specific path to the communicating program file (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.4) or a path to a folder containing multiple program files.
3.4.2 Using the Eclipse Plugin
To use our plugin in the eclipse the user must follow the following steps.
1. Download and install an Eclipse IDE.
2. In the Eclipse menu, go to Help menu and choose Install New Software.
3. In the Work with field introduce the update-site location :
http://download.gloss.di.fc.ul.pt/propi/update/
4. Select the SDK Feature and press Next.
5. Restart Eclipse.
6. Create a Project or Java Project.
7. Create a file with extension “.p” and select yes when the editor asks to add the Xtext
nature to your project.
8. Write a program on the created file and press save so the tool can check if there are
errors like illustrated in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Eclipse with an example
Figure 3.4: Command line menu
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter gives the necessary intuitions to understand how do we implemented the mul-
tiple elements necessary in our type checking procedure and also allow to show the main
parts of the verification process, in which the verification rules identify well-formed com-
munications processes permitting to distinguish communicating programs with progress.
We highlight specific issues of the implementation that are distinguishing features of our
work, such as how we implemented type extraction and how we validate linear channels
are fully used.
4.1 Grammar
DeclarationProcess ::= DeclarationStringPartialOrder Processes
Processes ::= Process (|Process)∗
Process ::= Input |ReplicatedInput |Output |
Parallel |ProcessChannelCreation
Input ::= V ariable ?V ariable [.P rocess]
ReplicatedInput ::= ∗V ariable ?V ariable [.P rocess]
Output ::= V ariable !V ariable [.P rocess]
Parallel ::= (Processes )
ProcessChannelCreation ::= new V ariable : Type inProcess
Declaration ::= TypingContextDeclaration |TypeDeclaration
TypingContextDeclaration ::= TypingContext = (V ariable : Type
(;V ariable : Type)∗)
TypeDeclaration ::= Type TypeV ariable = Type
StrictPartialOrder ::= Order = (EventOrder(;EventOrder)∗)
EventOrder ::= (Event(≺ Event)∗?)
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4.2 Technologies
In order to develop our static verification tool, we used Xtext, which is an open-source
framework for development of programming languages and domain-specific languages.
This framework allow to write our grammar and to implement the verification mecha-
nisms. After writing our grammar, Xtext allows to execute a code generator (Xtext arti-
facts) which derives the various language components using MWE2 (Modeling Workflow
Engine 2). This code generation creates classes to represent multiple nodes of a generated
abstract syntax tree. The created abstract classes allow to easily implement the verifica-
tion rules which are then used to perform the static verification of progress in a specified
communicating program written with our grammar. The framework also allowed to cre-
ate an eclipse plugin based on the developed static verification tool permitting the user the
ability to use our tool in an eclipse environment.
4.3 Verification process
In this section we explain how the verification process uses the input elements and returns
to the user a validation response for a specified communicating program. The first step of
the verification process is to obtain the variable type declarations, strict partial order and
the process specified previously by the user. This first step is demonstrated in a Java-like
pseudo-code Listing 4.1, starting by passing the DeclarationProcess to a visitor which
within the visitor proceeds by passing the variable declarations and the order to other
respective visitors.
Listing 4.1: Verification Process Pseudo-Code
check (P p ) {
Dec la ra t i onP rocessV i s i t o r v i s i t o r =
new Dec la ra t i onP rocessV i s i t o r ( j avaVa l i da to r , symbolTable , order ) ;
v i s i t o r . doSwitch ( p ) ;
Dec larat ionProcess dp = v i s i t o r . getDec lara t ionProcess ( ) ;
S t r i c t P a r t i a l O r d e r spo = dp . getOrder ( ) ;
Processes procs = dp . getProc ( ) ;
Typ ingRulesVa l ida tor t r v =
new Typ ingRulesVa l ida tor ( j avaVa l i da to r , symbolTable , order ) ;
boolean r e s u l t = t r v . mainTypeCheck ( symbolTable , order , process ) ;
The process will then be handled by mainTypeCheck which is presented in the pseudo-
code from Listing 4.2. This method receives all the specified elements and has the work
to return a positive or negative boolean result depending of the verification of progress.
Through the various stages of the verification of progress, the protocols usage for each
channel changes via updates to the type environment, that thus records the actual state
of all the channel protocols. Notice that channel creations and bound variables of input
communications also result in updates to the type environment. Before the main process
verification, a consistency check is performed (as described in Section 3.2.1) to assure
that all the variable declarations are consistent and in conformance with the global order.
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If the consistency check fails, the verification stops and a negative boolean result is re-
turned. In the opposite case the verification proceeds and the process is carried over to
our ValidationSwitch which will handle the different types of processes within the main
process and send each one to the respective verification rule. The Java code in Exam-
ple 4.3 demonstrates how the switch proceeds with the processes and how it handles the
linear and unrestricted input processes separately. The switch returns a positive result if
all the processes pass the verification rule with no exception. At the end a last verification
is performed by checking if all the variables used in the communicating program end in
a correct state, in other words, it is assured that all the typing context variables are fully
used, which means that for all the linear type communications an end type protocol must
be stored and for unrestricted type communications just shared output types.
Listing 4.2: mainTypeCheck Pseudo-Code
vSwitch = new Va l i da t i onSw i t ch ( j avaVa l i da to r , symbolTable , order ) ;
boolean mainTypeCheck ( symbolTable , order , Processes , freeVarsKeys ) {
boolean r e s u l t = fa lse ;
i f ( conformsCheck ( symbolTable , order ) ) {
r e s u l t = vSwitch . caseProcesses ( p ) ;
i f ( r e s u l t )
r e s u l t = freeVarsconformsCheck ( tab le , order , freeVarsKeys ) ;
}else{
System . out ( ” Not cons i s t en t ” ) ;
return fa lse ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
Listing 4.3: Validation Switch Processes and Input Java Code
@Override
public boolean caseProcesses ( Processes proc ) {
boolean r e s u l t = true ;
I t e r a t o r <Process> i t = proc . getProcs ( ) . i t e r a t o r ( ) ;
while ( i t . hasNext ( ) ) {
r e s u l t &&= caseProcess ( i t . next ( ) ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
@Override
public boolean caseProcess ( Process p ) {
i f ( p == nul l ) {
return th is . t p r . t I n a c t ( tab le , order , p ) ;
}
return super . doSwitch ( p ) ;
}
@Override
public boolean caseInput ( Inpu t p ) {
boolean r e s u l t = fa lse ;
r e s u l t = th is . t p r . t L I n ( tab le , order , p ) ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
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@Override
public boolean caseRepl ica tedInput ( Rep l i ca ted Inpu t p ) {
boolean r e s u l t = th is . t p r . tUIn ( tab le , order , p ) ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
A fundamental notion of our rule implementation is that the verification steps extract
from the type environment only what they need, leaving the remaining in the environment
to be used by the remaining processes. So it is necessary in the end to assure that all
the typing context variables were fully used by verifying that each one ends in a correct
state and without unused resources. This approach is an added value to our implemen-
tation since it is a different and more efficient way to address the implementation of the
rules with respect to other known implementations of session types. We had to adapt
the “mathematical view” of the rules to a context of implementation where managing
the type environment is more operational and also attending to efficiency concerns. A
simple example of this “mathematical abstraction” that we had to deal with was the con-
cept of “exists an element” which in the mathematical environment does not have to be
“managed” in the same way, since we had to really find the exact element in the imple-
mentation context. Our solution to this problem was to use an unique type environment
which changes the internal state according to the variable usages in the verification steps,
assuring that in each step the resources “extracted” are just the necessary ones for that ver-
ification rule, leaving the rest of the type environment unchanged for the next verification
steps. This also avoids the necessity of creating multiple copies of the type environment
with different states to each rule, which is more inefficient.
4.4 Type Environment
To implement the type environment we chose to use a symbol table which has an hash
table data structure, using the channel name to create the symbol to be used as the key
for the type protocol value. This corresponds to a standard choice to represent key value
pairs, where we also account for key replacement to support name clashes (when two
bound names have the same syntactic identity).
4.4.1 Methods
In this subsection we present the main necessary methods of the symbol table.
• void put(Symbol key, TypeInterface type) - this method is responsible to add the
symbol key to the symbol table, with the respective TypeInterface type associated.
• void remove(Symbol key) - this method is responsible to remove the key symbol
and the respective TypeInterface from the symbol table.
• TypeInterface get(Symbol key) - this method returns the TypeInterface associated
to the key symbol on the symbol table.
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• boolean containsSymbol(Symbol key) - returns if the symbol table contains the
symbol key.
• public Set<Symbol> getKeys() - returns a set of all the keys in the symbol table.
• List<Pair<TypeInterface,TypeInterface>> linearTypeSplit(TypeInterface type) - this
method returns a list with pairs of TypeInterface from a performed linear type split
of parameter type.
• List<Pair<Symbol, TypeInterface>> removenonun() - remove all the linear type
communications from the symbol table and set unrestricted communications with
an output polarity, returns a list of pairs with the symbols and respective TypeInterface
of the original elements to be then restored.
• void restoreTable ( List<Pair<Symbol, TypeInterface>> list) - restores to the sym-
bol table the elements from the parameter list returned from the previous rule
removenonun().
4.4.2 Example of type environment updates
The type extraction is performed by the output rules, which have to assure that the param-
eter type of the output channel is compatible and can be extracted from the type protocol
of the channel that is object of the communication. To further clarify how each verifica-
tion process step extracts from the type environment only what is needed, we reintroduce
an example similar to Example 3.2 (with just one client), which will allow us to show the
changes in the the type environment state through the verification steps.
Type Chat = e2 l i n # str ing .end
TypingContext = ( server : e1 un ? ( e2 l i n ! str ing .end ) ;
s t r i n g H e l l o : str ing )
Order = ( e1<e2 )
* server ?msg .msg ! s t r i n g H e l l o |
new chat : Chat in server ! chat . chat?s
stringHello : string
server : e1un ? (e2 lin ! string.end)
(4.1)
Before the verification starts the type environment has the following state represented
by the illustration 4.1. The represented type environment have 2 variables with the re-
spective protocol types. The stringHello has a string primitive type protocol, while the
channel server has a prefix shared input type. The first two main verification steps applied
to the communicating program are performed by the rules (T-UIn) and (T-LOut) (further
explained in Section 4.6) to the shared input process *server?msg and to the linear output
process msg!stringHello respectively.
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After this first two verification steps the type environment has the state represented
in the illustration 4.2. Channel server swaps the “?” annotation symbol for the wildcard
symbol annotation “ ” (further explained in Section 4.4.2), and channel msg is added
with the type protocol of the type parameter from server , which is consumed by msg!
stringHello, leaving an end type in the type environment (further omitted). Notice that
rule (T-LOut) must ensure that it is possible to extract the parameter type of the protocol
type of channel msg , which was a string from the type protocol of stringHello, also a
string type.
stringHello : string
server : e1un (e2 lin ! string.end)
msg : end
(4.2)
The third main verification step is performed to the channel creation new chat : Chat
in server!chat.chat?s by the rule (T-New), which results in the type environment state
represented by the illustration 4.3 in which the new channel chat is added to the type
environment with the type protocol (e2 lin # string.end).
stringHello : string
server : e1un (e2 lin ! string.end)
chat : e2 lin# string.end
(4.3)
The next verification step is performed by rule (T-UOut) to the communication pro-
cess server!chat. In this verification step the shared output rule has to assure that it can
extract the parameter type (e2 lin ! string.end) of channel server from the protocol type
of channel chat (e2 lin # string.end). The extraction is possible because the protocol
type (e2 lin # string.end), which represents a synchronization of message content with
a string type can be separated in the individual input and output communication : (e2 lin
? string.end) and (e2 lin ! string.end), so the extraction is possible and the remaining
unused protocol type (e2 lin ? string.end) is left in the type environment to be further
used by the next process, as the illustration 4.4 demonstrate.
stringHello : string
server : e1un (e2 lin ! string.end)
chat : e2 lin ? string.end
(4.4)
The following verification step completes the main verification process of the com-
munication processes. The process chat?s is verified by rule (T-LIn) which uses the
remaining protocol e2 lin ? string.end that was left in the type environment to validate
the process, leaving an end type protocol in the channel chat meaning that no further in-
teraction will take place on that channel. The final state of type environment is illustrated
in 4.5.
stringHello : string
server : e1un (e2 lin ! string.end)
chat : end
(4.5)
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Table 4.1: Extraction Table
Full type Extracted type Remaining type Notes
! Polarity stays the same
? Polarity stays the same
? ! ? Polarity stays the same
? ? Polarity changed to
! ! ! Polarity stays the same
! ? Return False Not possible to extract ? from !
! Return False Not possible to extract from !
? Return False Not possible to extract from ?
Return False Not possible to extract from
WildCard Polarity
The wildcard polarity is used in our type system in the context of shared communications.
A shared type communication, like a linear type communication, can be divided in input
and output communications. But while a linear type must be used strictly once, an input
shared type describes a reception of a message one or more times and an output shared
describes an emission of a message zero or more times. The wildcard polarity allow us
to represent the “zero or more times” that the channel can still be used after the first one
which is not possible with the regular “?” annotation. So when a shared input commu-
nication is used for the first time, the remaining type polarity is “ ”, to be used by the
following verifications, which ensures that the channel was already used at least once.
This auxiliary notation is a necessary addition to the theoretical system in which our work
is based, allowing us to type check channel extractions from the type environment when
synchronising messages containing shared communications like further explained using a
table.
The extraction table illustrated in Table 4.1, allows to explain how the polarities can
be extract in the shared communications context. In the first two lines, the “ ” polarity
means that the service was already used and that it is available to be further used zero
or more times, so we can extracted both the “!” (to use the service) and “?” (to offer
the service), the remaining polarity is the same since it continues to be available to be
used zero or more times. In the third and fourth line of the table, the polarity “?” means
that the service is still available to be used at least once and possibly more times, also
allowing to extract both the “!” and “?” polarities like the previous case. The remaining
polarity in the third line remains the same because the “!” just uses the service, while on
the fourth line the service is offered so it changes to the wildcard polarity meaning that
the service was already offered at least once. On the fifth line the “!” polarity means that
it allows to output unrestrictedly on that service zero or more times, so we can just extract
a “!” polarity, but can not extract a “?” polarity like the sixth line illustrates since the “!”
polarity is just the use of the service an not the offer of the service. All the other lines
represents extractions that are not possible. Both the “?” and “!” polarity can not assure
that the service is still available zero or more times, and the last case can never happen
since it is only possible to extract an input or an output, but not a wildcard. So all this last
cases receive a “return false” mark in the table illustration.
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4.5 Order
The access to the order must be efficient since it is necessary to check all the events
and their relation to assure that the events are consistent with the protocols usage. The
challenge was to assure the verifications with the lowest number of accesses to the order,
avoiding costly changes in the data structure every time we need to change the order
itself through the verification. To implement the order we created a “static order” class
representation where the overall order does not change but the node reference explained
below does. Notice that the overall order can have a potentially big dimension, which
means that creating a new order every time that the verification progresses and the obvious
need to “discard in time” already used events was not a viable option. With our approach
we can get a better efficiency managing the order to the purpose of this work.
To accomplish this we use a node reference which is the only attribute that changes
during the verification. This node reference is used to represent the root of the current
order (regardless if such an element is not the root of the entire order) at any moment of
the verification and is easily changed as necessary, allowing us to manipulate sub-orders
as needed. This sub-orders allow to efficiently validate different parts of the program
through the verification process. The order class has a hash table which allows to access
the event nodes by a key which is the name of the event. Each event node has the list
of his parent nodes, hence, each event knows the event nodes which precede them, that
therefore represent the order that must be respected by the communicating program. To
represent the first event that happens before any other event we have created a “virtual”
event and named it BigBang. This order representation creates a “forest” with one or more
tree of event nodes, since not all the events have to be related, and all this possible tree of
events have their first event preceded by the unique event BigBang, thus creating in fact
a single tree of events. With this approach we have the possibility to check if a certain
type specification with event annotations is consistent with the global order without any
significant change to the order, besides the node reference which can be easily restored.
Since the reference that marks the current event can change during the verification, there
is no need to in fact “update” the overall order through the verifications. To verify if a
certain event belongs to the order at a certain state of the verification, we use the method
containsEvent which returns a boolean value. This kind of verification is performed by
recursively checking the list of parents, until finding the reference that marks the current
node. In the case of the node reference is not reached through the recursion, this means
that the event does not belong to the current order as required and hence the verification
fails.
Before starting the static verification through the processes in which the events are
consequently verified recursively, a basic verification is performed first, to assure that all
the defined session types have legitimate events associated and in consonance with the
global order.
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4.5.1 Methods
In this subsection we present the main necessary methods used to implement the order.
• void addBunch(List<EventRelation> list) - this method acts like a constructor, adds
the event BigBang and the remaining event relations in the list , i.e. the relation (
e1,e2) where event e1 is added to the parents list of event e2.
• void restoreMarker(EventNode marker) - restores the marker to the received EventNode
parameter marker.
• EventNode getRoot() - returns the current EventNode marker reference in the order.
• EventNode changeRoot(Event event) - changes the current EventNode marker ref-
erence to the EventNode associated to the specified event and returns the old previ-
ous marker reference.
• boolean containsEvent(Event e,int parentDistance) - returns if the order contains
the event e. It is a recursive method, in which the parentDistance parameter is used
to assure that event e is at least “one event distance” from event marker reference.
• boolean conforms(TypeInterface t) - returns if all the events in TypeInterface t are
contained in the order using the previous method containsEvent.
• boolean conforms(SymbolTable table) - returns if all the TypeInterface in table are
contained in the order using the previous method for TypeInterface in table.
4.6 Rules
In this section we explain how we implemented the verification rules and what is their role
in the verification process. All the rules receive a symbol table with the type environment,
the order and the process itself. The rules (T-LIn), (T-LOut), (T-UIn) and (T-UOut) have
a similar skeleton with individual differences that will be described later. Listing 4.4
represents the pseudo-code of this skeleton with the generalized common steps of the
verification rules.
The first steps illustrated in the skeleton consist in acquiring the process symbols and
the respective protocol types using the symbols as the keys to access to the protocol values
stored in the symbol table. In the case the rule is an input or a replicated input, the previous
type associated to that symbol (if any) is stored. The next steps consist in verifying if the
protocol type associated to the process has a legitimate type for the respective rule, for
example the rule (T-LOut) can not receive an input type associated to the channel of the
process, (if this happens an error message is presented). After this first verification, the
associated event is also confirmed to be in concordance using the method containsEvent,
if this verification fails, the user receives an error message with the information of the
event causing the problem. The following verification is represented by MainVerification
where the differences between the different rules lie. After the main verification, in the
case of an already existing protocol type associated to that symbol, the type is restored in
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the type environment (so as to support bound name clashes). At the end the old marker
is restored to restore the order to a previous state; notice that the order changes within
the main verification in each rule and is restored to the stored previous marker at the end
(outside the main verification).
Listing 4.4: Common Skeleton Pseudo-Code
boolean SkeletonPseudoCode ( symbolTable , order , process ) {
boolean r e s u l t = true ;
symbols = getProcessSymbols ( process ) ;
types = getProcessTypes ( symbols , symbolTable ) ;
i f ( Inpu t | | Rep l i ca ted Inpu t )
oldType = savePreviousType ( symbol , symbolTable ) ;
i f ( checkIsCorrectType ( types ) ) {
i f ( ! order . conta insEvent ( type . GetEvent ( ) ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” I n c o n s i s t e n t event e r r o r ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
}else{
se tE r ro r ( ” I n v a l i d type p ro toco l e r r o r ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
i f ( r e s u l t ) {
M a i n V e r i f i c a t i o n ( ) ;
i f ( ( I npu t | | Rep l i ca ted Inpu t ) ) {
i f ( existsOldType ( ) )
t ab l e . put ( symbol , oldType ) ;
else
t ab l e . remove ( symbol ) ;
}
order . res toreMarker ( oldMarker ) ;
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
4.6.1 T-Inact Rule
This rule represents the type check of the inaction, which is represented by an end in our
type system. The goal of this rule is to type check all the inaction processes. The channel
usage of a inaction process is none, in concordance with our type system the inaction
process do not use anything in the type environment, so the verification always succeeds
and leaves the type environment untouched.
4.6.2 T-New Rule
This rule has the role to type check the channel creation processes. Which verification
steps are illustrated in Listing 4.5. The first verification performed is to check if the
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created channel has a type matched communication, since we do not allow unmatched
communications of restricted channels in our type system. We say that a type is matched
if it does not specify pending communications actions, so we exclude shared outputs and
linear communications that are not synchronisations as described in the predicate by Fig-
ure 4.1 from [9]. A matched linear communication is captured by the annotation # in the
protocol which means that there is a synchronisation to take place between two processes.
If the type of the new channel is matched, then it is added to the symbol table. Then using
a switch the verification proceeds to the continuation process to the respective rule, which
then returns the recursive result of the type checking of the continuation process. If the
result is positive, then we check if the type of the new channel was completely used to
validate the process. At the end we restore the channel type of the used name to the previ-
ous one (if any). This gives the possibility to overlap channel names in different contexts
without losing the content of the previous channel usage.
Listing 4.5: New Channel Pseudo-Code
Boolean tNew ( symbolTable , order , ProcessChannelCreation process ) {
Type channelType = v i s i t o r . caseType ( process . getType ( ) ) ;
i f ( ! type . matched ( channelType ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Unmatched communication e r r o r ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
i f ( r e s u l t ) {
t ab l e . put ( channelSymbol , channelType ) ;
r e s u l t = Switch . caseProcess ( process . getProc ( ) ) ;
i f ( r e s u l t ) {
i f ( ! checkTypeFullUse ( channelType , symbol , t ab l e ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type not f u l l y used e r r o r ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
}
i f ( channelExis ted )
t ab l e . put ( channelSymbol , oldType ) ;
else
t ab l e . remove ( channelSymbol ) ;
return r e s u l t ;
}
matched(T ) ,

matched(L) if T = e lin τ T1.L
true if T = end or T = e un ?T1
false otherwise
Figure 4.1: Matched predicate
Chapter 4. Implementation 42
4.6.3 T-Par Rule
This rule proceeds each one of the individual process in the parallel composition to the
verification. Notice that the verification of the first process can use resources from the
type environment that will be further used to verify the second process.
4.6.4 T-LIn Rule
This rule is applied to the linear input processes. Following the skeleton Figure 4.4, the
first verification is performed to the channel type of the process: in this case only a linear
synchronisation or a linear input are accepted. After validating the channel type we verify
if the event associated to the process is in conformance with the actual state of the global
order of the events. If the event is not valid, then a error message is presented and the val-
idation fails; the same applies if the channel type is not the expected. After this first tests
the main verification of this rule (illustrated in Listing 4.6) starts: first we add the channel
y and the respective type to the type environment. The current event is marked as root,
which is essential to validate the soundness of following events, assuring that the con-
tinuation process just has events of greater order. When the root is changed, the method
also returns the previous root marker which will allow to restore the order to the previous
state, so the following verification can proceed. The following verifications depends on
the channel type where within the method tryCombinations different combination of type
splinting are tested. If the protocol usage of the channel is a linear synchronisation then
it is necessary to open the type to the correct input and output types separately; to find
the correct split it is necessary to try to type check this different combinations recursively,
always having in consideration the continuation of the linear type. On the other hand if
the channel type is a linear input communication then the split is more simple. In this
case the split consists into the already known input type and an end type. Notice that a
split separates a matched channel type in output and input capabilities only, so splitting
happens only once for each matched channel type. In both cases a recursive validation is
performed inside the method to assure the correctness of the splits in the communicating
program. The continuation type of the left side of the split is assigned to the channel type
to assure that the performed type split type checks, if so, the channel type is assign with
the right side of the split and the verification continues. After this recursive verifications
we confirm the full use of the channel protocol, assuring that the protocol was complete.
In the end we restore the channel type to a previous one if the same channel name already
existed before as we explained in the previous rule. The order marker is also restored to
the oldMarker, which was saved before starting the recursive validations, so the order can
be maintained valid after the necessary changes in the event marker through the recursion.
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Listing 4.6: Linear Input Main Verification Pseudo-Code
M a i n V e r i f i c a t i o n ( ) {
t ab l e . put ( ySymbol , xParamType ) ;
oldMarker = order . changeRoot ( inputEvent ) ;
i f ( ! t ryCombinat ions ( xSymbol , ySymbol , tab le , p , e r r o r ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type of p ro toco l not respected e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}else
i f ( ! checkTypeFullUse ( xParamType , ySymbol , t ab l e ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type not f u l l y used e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
}
4.6.5 T-LOut Rule
This rule is applied to all linear output processes. The initial part of the verification fol-
lows the skeleton in Listing 4.4. The first verification performed to the channel type is
analogous to all other rules. In this case the process type is assured to be a linear syn-
chronisation or a linear output. If the process type is valid, then the event associated
to the process is verified to be in concordance with the global order using the method
containsEvent, if the validation fails because of the process type or an invalid event situa-
tion, then respective errors are presented to the user. Also similarly to the previous linear
rule, the actual event is marked as root to save the current state of the order and the core
of the verification starts, like illustrated by Listing 4.7.
First we need to assure that the parameter type of the channel to be output (y) con-
forms to the specified channel protocol. To perform this verification we use canExtract
method to compare the type protocol of the channel with the type parameter of the pro-
tocol and verify if the first can be extracted from the second. The type environment is
updated consistently if the extraction succeeds or an error message presented to the user
if it fails. If the previous verification succeed, a recursive validation starts through the
method tryCombinations. The recursive validation through the processes is necessary to
verify if “some path” validates the communication process. To do this do we need to open
the type in two parts, to the correct input and output types separately in the case we are
dealing with a linear synchronization, notice that in most cases multiple combinations are
necessary to cover all the possibilities. In the case we are dealing with a linear output
communication, they split into a single output and an end type, always having in con-
sideration the continuation processes of the the type in both of the cases which are also
validated too through the recursion. If no valid possible combination of type splits exist
to validate the communication process, then the user receives an error message explaining
that the protocol specified for that certain communication channel is not respected.
After this validation, one more verification is necessary. We need to verify if all the
events associated to the channel protocol that is output, are contained in the actual order
state. To verify if all the events from the channel are legitimate to our order, we get the
type protocol from the channel and test all the events associated with containsAll method,
which calls the containsEvent individually for each event. Notice that if the channel is a
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shared type communications then just exists one event to be verified. In the end of this
rule the order marker is restored to the oldMarker, which was maintained before starting
the recursive validations like in the previous rule.
Listing 4.7: Linear Output Main Verification Pseudo-Code
M a i n V e r i f i c a t i o n ( ) {
oldMarker = order . changeRoot ( outputEvent ) ;
i f ( ! canExt rac t ( t ab l e . get ( ySymbol ) , xParamType , t ab l e ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type of p ro toco l not respected e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
i f ( r e s u l t ) {
i f ( ! t ryCombinat ions ( xSymbol , ySymbol , tab le , p , e r r o r ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type of p ro toco l not respected e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}else
i f ( ! c o n t a i n s A l l ( t ab l e . get ( ySymbol ) , order ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” I n c o n s i s t e n t event ( s ) e r r o r ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
}
}
4.6.6 T-UIn Rule
This rule is applied to all the shared input processes. The first part of the verification is
analogous to the other rules, where the channel type is verified to be in agreement with
the type of process and the event associated is confirmed to be in conformance with the
global order. In this case for the channel type to be in agreement it must be a shared type
communication with an input or wildcard polarity with a corresponding event associated.
If some of this verifications fail, the user receives an error message with the respective
error information.
The following steps of the verification process to be explained are illustrated in List-
ing 4.8. Within the main verification, some temporarily changes are performed to the
type environment. First we need to remove the channel type from the type environment
by removing the protocol associated to the x symbol from the symbol table. Then all the
linear type protocols in the type environment need to be momentously removed ( set to an
end type), and all the remaining shared communications set to the output polarity (“!”) to
proceed the validation. Notice that all of the symbol and types from the linear and shared
communications in the symbol table are stored before the changes, with the purpose of
being restored after this validation. This changes are necessary because only unrestricted
communications can be present in the type environment to perform this verification, since
it is not allowed to use any linear resources in the continuation process besides possibly on
the received channel. Also the reason why the the shared communications polarities are
necessary to be changed while the verification is being performed, is because we can not
allow other services offers to take place (other input shared) in the continuation process
of that shared communication.
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After this changes in the type environment, the parameter type of the channel type is
added to the type environment with the y symbol and the order marker is changed to the
input event associated to the channel type, always storing the old marker to be restored in
the end of the verification. Subsequently the next process (associated to the actual pro-
cess) is proceeded to the respective rule, returning the result of the recursive verification of
the following processes. If the result is positive then we proceed to verify if the protocol
that was associated to the y symbol was fully used which means to verify if it terminates
in a correct and expected state. The last part of this verification consists in restoring the
changes previously performed. All the linear and shared type communication previously
stored return to the type environment, the channel type polarity is changed to a wildcard
polarity (further explain in Section 4.4.2) and restored to the type environment. At the
end the order marker is also restored to the previous stored old marker. Notice that analo-
gously to the (T-New) and (T-LIn) Rule, in the case of previously existing a channel using
the same channel name, the first one is restored to the respective previous type which was
saved in the beginning of the rule.
Listing 4.8: Shared Input Main Verification Pseudo-Code
M a i n V e r i f i c a t i o n ( ) {
t ab l e . remove ( xSymbol ) ;
savedTypesList = tab l e . remove non shared ( ) ;
t ab l e . put ( ySymbol , xParamtype ) ;
oldMarker = order . changeRoot ( inputEvent ) ;
r e s u l t = Switch . caseProcess ( p . nextProc ( ) ) ;
i f ( r e s u l t ) {
i f ( ! checkTypeFullUse ( xParamType , ySymbol , t ab l e ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type not f u l l y used e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
t ab l e . res to reTab le ( savedTypesList ) ;
t ab l e . put ( xSymbol , xType . s e t P o l a r i t y ( ” ” ) ) ;
}
}
4.6.7 T-UOut Rule
This rule is applied to all the shared output processes. To pass through the first verification
the channel type of the process must be a shared output communication and have an event
associated in concordance with the global order. The following steps of the verification
process are illustrated in Listing 4.9. After passing the first verifications, the x symbol is
removed from the symbol table. The channel usage is rule out in the continuation to ex-
clude processes that offer an input in the continuation of an output. Similarly to the linear
output rule, using canExtract method, it is confirmed that it is possible to extract the chan-
nel y type protocol in the type environment from the parameter type specified in channel
x protocol, so the type environment can be updated. If the operation is not possible then
an error message is presented to the user explaining that the channel do not respect the
expected protocol (further details of the type environment updates in Section 4.4.2). Af-
ter this point we change the event marker to the event associated to the channel type,
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always storing the previous marker to restore it later. The next step is to verify if all the
events associated to the channel y protocol are legitimate and in respect to the present
global order of events, this step is accomplished using the containsAll method that uses
the containsEvent method for each event, once again an error message is displayed to the
user in regard to the order if some event is not in concordance. After this step the next
process is proceeded to the the respective rule and a boolean result is received recursively
from the following verifications. We now can add the respective x channel protocol back
to the type environment and restore the event marker to the previous event marker.
Listing 4.9: Shared Output Main Verification Pseudo-Code
M a i n V e r i f i c a t i o n ( ) {
t ab l e . remove ( xSymbol ) ;
i f ( ! canExt rac t ( t ab l e . get ( ySymbol ) , xParamType , t ab l e ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” Type of p ro toco l not respected e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
oldMarker = order . changeRoot ( outputEvent ) ;
i f ( ! c o n t a i n s A l l ( t ab l e . get ( ySymbol ) , order ) ) {
se tE r ro r ( ” I n c o n s i s t e n t event ( s ) e r r o r . ” ) ;
r e s u l t = fa lse ;
}
r e s u l t = Switch . caseProcess ( p . nextProc ( ) ) ;
t ab l e . put ( xSymbol , xType ) ;
}
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis presents a type checking procedure based on session types complemented with
the notion of event. Session types allow to describe the interactions of each channel, while
the events allow to guarantee that the flow of the program follows a sound ordering. To
develop this work it was essential to study and learn a new concepts that took time to
become clear, more precisely an introduction to the pi-calculus [5, 6], the use of session
types in a linear pi-calculus [8] and the use of session types with events [9].
Our work consisted in developing a tool that allows to statically guarantee fidelity and
progress for message passing concurrent systems with point-to-point communications.
We created a grammar which permits to specify the session types (with the events anno-
tations) and the process interactions. The tool verifies the specified program through a
set of rules, allowing to distinguish concurrent systems that respect the specified protocol
and achieve progress. Our grammar is separated in three main elements, the variable dec-
larations which specifies the variables and respective protocols types which are the base
to create the type environment, the order of the events which uses the “happens-before”
relation to define an order between events and the process containing the interactions that
form the communications.
The manipulation of type environment was a challenge, which resulted in a different
kind of approach. The main challenge was the necessity to follow the mathematical rules
and deal with the mathematical abstraction inherent to them. Our approach distinguishes
itself in the way that the updates are performed, since each process uses just what it
needs in each verification step, leaving the rest to be used by the remaining processes.
This allows to use always the same environment passed on from rule to rule and avoid
having more than one environment with different states. Although there are other works
that follow the same approach, we believe our implementation, to some extent, is more
streamlined at the level of type extraction.
Another challenge was the implementation of the order relation, which had the ef-
ficiency as main concern, since the verification procedure performs multiple operation
on the order relation. Our solution was to create a “static order” which has a reference
marker that is the only element that changes, and which allows to create different sub-
orders. This implementation allows to avoid the need to restructure the order throughout
the verification. We needed to perform additions to the theoretical system, to assure the
correct extraction of shared communications, more precisely we introduced the wildcard
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polarity, which was not defined previously in the theoretical system in which our work is
based.
In addition to the command line tool, we also developed an eclipse plugin which
allows the user to use our tool in an eclipse environment.
As future work the tool will be extended so as to support multi-party interaction, fol-
lowing the approach of conversation types introduced by Caires and Vieira [1], and the
possibility of automatically infer the event identifiers through an algorithm that identifies
the events and the partial order from the code, giving the user the possibility to just spec-
ify the (classic) session types. Possible future work also includes the development of a
intermediate language to serve as “bridge” between the type checking procedures demon-
strated in this work and a more practical environment of development. Such language
would give the developer an opportunity to statically verify small critical zones of code
that use point-to-point communication in a high-level language, allowing to identify local
deadlocks prior to the code execution.
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